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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code
section 78A-3-102G). Pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
this matter was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the district court erred in holding that NYA did not violate the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it exercised its discretion under the REPC to
extend the closing date indefinitely in disregard of Defendants' justified expectations and
~

the agreed common purpose of the contract. The Court reviews the district court's
"interpretation of a contract" for "correctness." Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003
UT 50, 116, 84 P.3d 1134. This issue was preserved in the Harrisons' motion for

vi:)

summary judgment filed on November 8, 201 l(R. 110-80), and reply thereto (R. 229-65),
and in their motion to reconsider filed on January 22, 2013 (R. 543-81 ), and reply thereto
(R. 662-71 ).
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the district court erred in holding that the Harrisons breached

the REPC by refusing NYA's tender of payment which was conditioned on Defendants'
acceptance ofNYA's disputed interpretation of the REPC, including acceptance of terms
not found in the REPC itself. The Court reviews the district court's "interpretation of a
.,;jj)

contract" for "correctness." Green River Canal Co., 2003 UT 50, 116. The Court also
reviews the district court's interpretation of a statute for correctness. Gillmor v. Summit
vii

Cnty., 2010 UT 69, 1 16, 246 P.3d 102. This issue was preserved in the Harrisons'

opposition to NYA's partial motion for summary judgment, filed February 24, 2012 (R.

1

325-51), and in their motion to reconsider filed on January 22, 2013 (R. 543-81), and
reply thereto (R. 662-71 ).
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the district court erred in holding that NYA was not required to
perform its obligations under the REPC within a reasonable time. The Court reviews the
district court's "interpretation of a contract" for "correctness." Green River Canal Co.,
2003 UT 50, ,I 16. This issue was preserved in the Harrisons' motion for summary
judgment filed on November 8, 2011 (R. 110-80), and reply thereto (R.229-65), and in its
opposition to NYA's motion for summary judgment, filed February 24, 2012 (R. 325-51).
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether the district court erred in holding that NYA did not breach the
REPC as a matter of law by failing to make unconditional Extension Payments and
failing to close on the Property. The Court reviews the district court's "interpretation of a
contract" for "correctness." Green River Canal Co., 2003 UT 50, ,I 16. This issue was
preserved in the Harrisons' motion for summary judgment filed on November 8,201 l(R.
110-80), and reply thereto (R. 229-65), and in their motion to reconsider filed on January
22, 2013 (R. 543-81 ), and reply thereto. (R. 662-71 ).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-802. Tender - Offer in writing sufficient - Objection Must be specific or waived.
(1) An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument
or specific personal property is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual production
and tender of the money, instrument, or property.
(2) The person to whom a tender is made shall, at the time, specify any objection to the
money, instrument, or property, or it is considered waived.
(3) If the objection is to the amount of money, the terms of the instrument or the amount
or kind of property, the person shall specify the amounts, terms, or kind which is

2

required, or be precluded from objection afterwards.
~

(A copy of the statute is attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 1.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This suit arises out of a dispute over the interpretation of a real estate purchase
contract. The Harrisons, an elderly couple seeking money to fund their retirement, own
20.27 acres of real property located at approximately 950 West 700 South in the city of
Springville, Utah County, Utah (the "Property"). 1 Plaintiff, New York Ave., LLC
("NYA"), a real estate investor with hopes to develop the Property, and the Harrisons
entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") in November 2006. The REPC
permitted NYA to exercise its "discretion" to extend the closing date from the agreed
upon October 31, 2007, for thirty days at a time by paying $6,250 in interest-free
payments toward the purchase price to the Harrisons each month it extended ("Extension
Payments").
Unhappy with market conditions and the development potential of the Property,
NYA sought to exercise its discretion under the REPC to convert the purchase contract
:.:j)

into an indefinite-term option contract or interest-free seller-financed purchase. After
delaying its purchase of the property for nearly two years beyond the original closing date
and doing nothing to develop the Property within the previous year, NYA balked when
the Harrisons requested that they purchase the Property within a reasonable time, set a
date that they believed was reasonable, and invited a discussion with NYA about when a
1

During the pendency of this case, Mrs. Harrison passed away.

3

reasonable time might be. NYA maintained that it had no obligation to purchase the
Property within a reasonable time, either under the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing or the common-law rule that contracts be performed within a reasonable time.
After the commencement of this action, NYA purported to make the August 2009
Extension Payment (the "Disputed Extension Payment") on the condition that the
Harrisons accept NYA's interpretation of the contract. This was an inappropriate use of
the tender rule to attempt to bully the Harrisons into giving up their rights under the
REPC. After the Harrisons returned the Disputed Extension Payment and expressed a
continued willingness to accept unconditional tender, NYA did not withdraw its
conditions and did not tender any additional Extension Payments thereafter.
On summary judgment, the district court ruled that the Harrisons did not
anticipatorily breach the REPC by requesting that NYA close on the Property within a
reasonable time. The district court further ruled that NYA was not required to perform
under the REPC within a reasonable amount of time, that NYA did not violate the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by extending the closing indefinitely or by
making the Disputed Extension Payment conditioned on the Harrisons accepting its
interpretation of the REPC, and that the Harrisons breached the REPC by refusing the
Disputed Extension Payment, which the district court characterized as "valid tender."
2

The district court denied the Harrisons motion to reconsider this ruling. After another

2

Copies of the Ruling and Order are attached to the Addendum respectively as
Exhibits 2 and 3.
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round of summary judgment briefing on damages, which the Harrisons appealed in part
but are not pursuing, the district court entered final judgment against the Harrisons,
which it modified in its ruling on NYA's subsequent Rule 60(b) motion. This appeal
~

followed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

The Parties Enter Into the Real Estate Purchase Contract and
Addenda

1.

The Harrisons own 20.27 acres of real property located at approximately

950 West 700 South in the city of Springville, Utah County, Utah (the "Property"). (R.
40, if 7.)
2.
~

On November 10, 2006, NYA and the Harrisons entered into a Real Estate

Purchase Contract for Land ("REPC") to purchase the Property. (R. 40, ,r 8; Real Estate
Purchase Contract for Land ("REPC"), attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 4.)

3.

NYA's purchase of the Property was conditioned on its approval of a

physical condition inspection of the Property, a survey, and approval of laws, ordinances,
regulations, and deed restrictions. (R. 29, ,r 8; REPC ,r 8.) In order to object to the
Property and modify the REPC on these grounds, NYA was required to notify the
Harrisons of its objections within 90 days of November 22, 2006. (R. 24, ,r 11;
;JJ)

Addendum No. 1 to Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC Addendum No. 1") ,r 11,
attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 5.)

5

4.

After the Due Diligence Deadline, the earnest money was dispersed to the

Harrisons and became "non-refundable thereafter if Buyer fails to close for any reason."
(R. 24, ,r 9; REPC Addendum No. 1 19.)

5.

Addendum No. 1 set settlement for 180 days from the date of the fully

executed contract and permitted NYA to pay $12,500 per month in "non-refundable
earnest money" to extend the contract beyond that date. (R. 24,113, 10; REPC
Addendum No. 1 ,r,r 3, 10.)
6.

On or about November 22, 2006, the parties entered into a second

addendum modifying the earlier agreement ("Addendum No. 2"). (R. 39, ,r 15;
Addendum No. 2 to Real Estate Purchase Contact ("REPC Addendum No. 2") ,r 15,
attached to the addendum as Exhibit 6.) This addendum, among other things, extended
closing to October 31, 2007, reduced the Extension Payments to $6,250 per month, and
required the Harrisons to include 20.27 water shares with the purchase. (R. 21, ,r,r 1-5;
REPC Addendum No. 2 ,r,r 1-5.)
7.

Between the contract date and closing, the Harrisons agreed that they would

not change the leases, alter or improve the property, or financially encumber the property.
(R. 28, ,r 12; REPC ,r 12.) The Harrisons were also required to pay taxes and other
carrying costs during the time the Property was under contract. (R. 28, ,r 10.1; REPC

110.1.)
8.

The REPC, addenda, exhibits, and seller's disclosures constitute the

"entire" contract between the parties and can only be changed "by written agreement of
the parties." (R. 28, ,r 14; REPC ,r 14.)
6

9.

Time is of the essence in performance of obligations under the REPC. (R.

27, ,r 21; REPC ,r 21.)

B.

NYA Delays Closing on the Property for Nearly Two Years

IO.

About two months after the parties entered into the REPC, on January 30,

2007, NYA owner Steven Kelly wrote a letter to the Harri sons informing of them of a
problem connecting the Property to the Springville sewer system. He further stated
It looks like I won't be able to develop the property until mid-2008
at the earliest. However, I like the property and want to continue the
contract as it is currently written.... On October 31st I will start
making the monthly payments to you that we agreed upon until I
close on the property, which will be when the sewer trunk line is
installed and I can get the necessary approvals from the city to
develop.
(R. 151-52.)
11.

The information contained in the January 30, 2007 letter, which was sent

nearly two months after the parties entered into the REPC, was never added to the REPC
...iJ

or agreed to by the Harrisons. (See generally REPC.)
12.

On September 19, 2007, Mr. Kelly wrote a letter to the Harrisons updating

them on his progress in developing the Property. Specifically, he informed them that he
had found a way to work around the problem with connecting to the Springville sewer
system. He further stated, "I will be paying the extension fees as outlined in the purchase
contract until I close. It slwuldn't be too far into the future." (R. 149-50. (emphasis
added.))

7

13.

In early 2008, Mr. Kelly unsuccessfully attempted to get approval from

Springville City to work around the sewer trunk line issue. (R. 141.) Mr. Kelly did not
attempt to receive sewer approval thereafter. (R. 137, 127.)
14.

In April 2008, Mr. Kelly disclosed to his site engineer Brian Gabler that

"[W]e are holding off pursuing this at the current time." (R. 126.)
15.

On March 5, 2009, frustrated with NYA's lack of progress toward

purchasing the Property, the Harrisons requested NYA close on the property no later than
August 5, 2009, nearly two years after the original closing deadline, on the grounds that
under Utah common law, agreements that do not specify a time for performance must be
performed within a reasonable amount of time, and that NYA's failure to close violated
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. 124-25 (a copy of the Letter from S.
Newman to K. Kelly, dated March 5, 2009 ("March 5 Letter") is attached to the
addendum as Exhibit 7). ); see also Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P .2d 852, 85 8
(Utah 1998). The Harrisons invited NYA to propose "a reasonable settlement deadline."
(R. 124-25; March 5 Letter.)
16.

The district court specifically held that the March 5 Letter and the

Harrisons' legal position that NYA was required to perform in a reasonable time was not
an anticipatory breach of the REPC, and this ruling has not been appealed. (R. 3 91.)

C.

The Parties Commence Litigation

17.

On June 22, 2009, NYA brought claims against the Harrisons for

rescission, breach of contract, and declaratory judgment. (R. 21-41.) The Harrisons

8

counterclaimed for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing on the grounds that NYA failed to close within a reasonable time. (R. 42-58.)
18.
~

NYA continued to make unconditional Extension Payments under the

REPC in June and July 2009, which the Harrisons accepted. The Harrisons did not sell or
attempt to sell the Property to any other purchaser, and therefore complied with their
obligation under the REPC.
19.

Two months after litigation commenced, on August 31, 2009, NYA

purported to make an Extension Payment (the "Disputed Extension Payment"). The
Disputed Extension Payment was accompanied by a three-page letter from NYA's
counsel outlining NYA's interpretation of the REPC (the "August 31 Letter"). (R. 11618 (a copy of the Letter from K. Kelly to M. Gay lord et al., dated August 31, 2009
("August 31 Letter") is attached to the addendum as Exhibit 8).) It made acceptance of
the Disputed Extension Payment contingent on the Harrisons' acceptance ofNYA's
interpretation as set forth in the Amended Complaint. (R. 116-18; August 31 Letter.)
20.

In the August 3 1 Letter, NYA set forth its understanding of the terms of the

REPC as follows:
(a)
The purchase price for the property was based on the
assumption that it could be developed as single family residential
that would maximize the development potential of the land based on
the zoning laws in place that govern the subject property. With the
lack of sewer capabilities, and through further information garnered
through the development process that showed insufficient storm
drainage capacity, the property could not (at the time) be developed
to its maximum potential.
(b)
The ability to postpone closing on the property until it could
be developed to its maximum potential was crucial to my clients.

9

Accordingly, Extension Payments were "a credit towards the
purchase price" of the property as stated in the REPC and was in no
way to be considered "rent" or an interest payment.
(c)
The closing deadline was being extended and the Extension
Payment reduced in part to account for the fact that, since the sewer
was not readily available, it might be some time before the property
could be developed as anticipated.
(d)
The REPC could be extended, at [NYA's] discretion as stated
in the REPC, to allow for the property to be developed to its full
potential. This includes, but is not limited to: sewer line extension
installed to the property, storm drainage readily available, and
property being economically feasible to develop under zoning
ordinance of Springville City and existing market conditions.
(R. 116-17; August 31 Letter at 2-3.)
21.

The August 31 Letter concluded:
By negotiating this $6,250 check, you are agreeing with my client
that it is entitled under the REPC to make these payments in order to
postpone closing in accordance with the express terms of the REPC
until it is economically feasible to move forward with a residential
development of the property as discussed above, including in
paragraphs (a) through (d).

(R. 116; August 31 Letter at 3.)
22.

The conditions set forth in the August 31 Letter were not part of the express

terms of the REPC. Had the Harrisons accepted the conditions they would have waived
their pending claims for breach of the REPC for failure to close within a reasonable time
and of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for exercising discretion under
the REPC to deprive the Harrisons of the benefit of their bargain. Utah Code Ann. 78B5-802(3).
23.

In response to NYA's conditional tender of the Disputed Extension

Payment, the Harrisons, through counsel, informed NYA that its "attempt to modify the
10

terms of the [REPC] and to make the negotiation of the monthly check conditioned upon
your client's unilateral and unexpressed intentions and 'understanding' is not only
inappropriate, but constitutes a further breach of the parties' [REPC.]" (R. 114-15 3 (a
;;;;

copy of the Letter from J. Boren to K. Kelly, dated September 2, 2009 ("September 2
Response") is attached to the addendum as Exhibit 9).) They further informed NYA that
they would "continue to accept the monthly checks so long as you withdraw your
inappropriate conditions." (R. 114-15; September 2 Response.)
24.

ii/JP

NYA refused to withdraw its inappropriate conditions and made no more

Extension Payments under the REPC, nor did it purchase the Property.
25.

In late 2011 and early 2012, the Harrisons and NYA cross-moved for

summary judgment on all claims. Specifically, on November 8, 2011, the Harrisons filed
a motion for summary judgment. (R. 110-80.) NYA opposed the motion on December
7, 2011 (R. 192-224), and Harrison replied on December 19, 2011 (R. 229-65). NYA
filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on January 9, 2012. (R. 290-319.)
The Harrisons opposed the motion on February 24, 2012 (R. 325-51), and NYA replied
on March 8, 2012 (R. 352-82).
26.

On June 14, 2012, the Court issued a Ruling on Cross Motions for

Summary Judgment ("Ruling"). (R. 384-401.) The Harrisons appeal this Ruling and
related Order, which held among other things, that:

~

-...,J

3

The second page of the September 2 Response letter was not labeled in the
record by the lower court, thus references to the letter shall be to R. 114-15.

11

(a) Because NYA could extend the contract at its discretion, it did not
deprive the Harrisons of the fruit of the contract when it exercised its discretion.
(R. 387-88.)
(b) NYA was not required to purchase the Property within a reasonable
time because the REPC permitted it to exercise its discretion to extend closing
indefinitely. (R. 386-87.)
(c) The Disputed Extension Payment constituted valid tender because the
letter accompanying the payment contained only conditions the Harrisons had
agreed to when they permitted NYA to extend closing at its discretion. (R. 3 8991.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court's summary judgment ruling should be reversed. NYA
effectively sought to transform the REPC into a long-term financing agreement, which
was not contemplated by the parties, and inappropriately used the tender rule to pressure
the Harrisons into accepting this modification. NYA breached the REPC by exercising
its discretion under the contract to deprive the Harrisons of the benefit of the bargainthe sale of the property-and refusing to purchase the Property within a reasonable time,
as required by Utah law. NYA further breached the contract by failing to make the
August extension payment and failing to close within 30 days of its last Extension
Payment, as required by the REPC. Conversely, the Harrisons never breached the REPC.
They at all times remained willing to accept Extension Payments while the parties
litigated the interpretation of the REPC, only refusing to accept the Disputed Extension

12

Payment, which would have required them to accept NYA's interpretation of the REPC,
essentially ending the litigation in NYA's favor without allowing a court to adjudicate the
dispute. The refusal of the Disputed Extension Payment under the circumstances here
:J

was not a breach of the REPC, let alone a material breach. Accordingly, this Court
should reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of NYA and
against the Harrisons.

ARGUMENT

I.

NYA VIOLATED THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING BY USING ITS DISCRETION UNDER THE TERMS OF THE
REPC TO DEPRIVE THE HARRISONS OF THE BENEFIT OF THE
BARGAIN
The district court incorrectly ruled that because the REPC gave NYA "sole

~

discretion" to extend the closing deadline indefinitely by making an Extension Payment,
that it could exercise its discretion in a way that deprived the Harri sons of the benefit of
the parties' bargain-the sale of the Property. (R. 387.) Specifically, it held that because
the contract permitted NYA to "pay an additional amount of non-refundable earnest
money to continue the contract monthly after the settlement deadline," which was left to
NYA's "sole discretion," that requiring NYA to close in a reasonable amount of time
would be inconsistent with an express term of the contract. (R. 392-93, 387.) It also held
that there were disputed issues of fact about the parties' justified expectations. (R. 3 87.)
Both rulings were in error: an express grant of discretion does not abrogate the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and the undisputed facts demonstrate that at the time the

13

parties entered into the REPC, they anticipated that NYA would purchase the Property
within a reasonable time.
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, parties to a contract agree "not
to intentionally do anything to injure the other party's right to receive the benefits of the
contract." Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, ,I 18, 173 P.3d 865. An explicit
statement giving NYA "discretion" does not remove the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing from the contract, but instead amplifies the duty. See Smith v. Grand Canyon
Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ,r 19, 84 P.3d 1154 ("[W]here one party has discretion over

another according to the terms of a contract, that party must act with good faith and fair
dealing."); CookAssocs. v. Utah Sch. & Inst. Trust Lands Admin., 2010 UT App 284,

,r 27, 243 P.3d 888.

Indeed, "[t]he degree to which a party to a contract may invoke the

protections of the covenant turns on the extent to which the contracting parties have
defined their expectations and imposed limitations on the exercise of discretion through
express contract terms." Markham, 2007 UT App 379 ,r 21 (quoting Smith, 2003 UT 57,

,I 20). When "express contract terms" do not limit a party's exercise of discretion, the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is paramount. Id. While the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing cannot create "obligations inconsistent with express contractual
terms," it can fill in the gaps in a contract with terms "the parties would doubtless have
adopted if they had thought to address [them] by contract," so that one party cannot run
amok with the discretion granted to it under the terms of the contract. Young Living
Essential Oils, LC v. Marin, 2011 UT 64, ,r 10,266 P.3d 814 (internal quotations

omitted).
14

Q

Courts have frequently implied a "reasonableness" limitation on the exercise of
contractually permitted discretion. In Markham, the court supplied an "objective
standard of reasonableness" to a seller's discretion to cancel a real estate purchase
.;;

contract if it disapproved of the buyer's financial information. Markham, 2007 UT App
379 ,r 22. The court noted that without an objective reasonableness standard governing
the seller's discretion, the seller's promise to sell the Property would be "illusory." Id.

,r 23.

Similarly, in Cook Assoc., a clause in a lease agreement gave the landlord "sole

discretion" to raise rents every five years as the landlord deemed "reasonably necessary."
\iii

Cook Assoc., 2010 UT App 284, ,r,r 18, 27. The court held that because of the explicit

grant of discretion to the landlord, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing served "to
protect the other party from an inappropriate exercise of that discretion." Id. ,r 27.
Because the contract imposed no "agreed formula" or "express standard," the landlord
was required to exercise its discretion "reasonably within the contemplation of the
parties" in accordance with their "purpose, intentions, and expectations" when it raised
rent. Id.

,r,r 28-29.

Here the Real Estate Purchase Contract gave NYA "sole discretion" with respect
to when the closing would take place. Although NYA was required to pay additional
money toward the purchase of the Property in order to secure an extension of the
settlement deadline, there was no stated contractual limit on the number of times NYA
could extend the deadline. Accordingly, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
.:;;

required NYA to exercise its discretion "reasonably within the contemplation of the
parties" in accordance with their "purpose, intentions, and expectations." Cook Assocs.,

15

2010 UT App 284, ,r,r 28-29; see also Markham, 2007 UT App 379, ,r 21 ("Where the
contract allows discretion but does not provide any express standard for exercising that
discretion, the covenant imposes an objective standard of reasonableness."). It is
undisputed that the parties entered into a purchase contract (as opposed to an option
contract or a seller-financed transaction), that NYA informed the Harrisons on several
occasions that it would close within a relatively short period of time, and that the parties
never agreed that closing could be postponed on the basis of the availability of the sewer
line or the economic feasibility of development of the Property. Extending the closing
for nearly two years beyond the parties' originally agreed-upon deadline deprived the
Harrisons of the fruits of the contract in violation of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing as a matter of law. Taken to its extreme, this interpretation permits NYA to pay
$6,250 per month interest-free until it pays off the Property in approximately forty years. 4
Given the fact that the REPC is a purchase contract, the age of the Harrisons, and the
communications between the parties, such an interpretation is far outside the
contemplation of the parties when they entered the REPC. Accordingly, this Court
should reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of NYA and enter
summary judgment for the Harrisons. Alternatively, the Court should reverse the district
court and remand for a determination of whether NYA's conduct in extending closing for

4

Had NYA obtained a $3,000,000 loan amortized over 40 years, his payments
would have been approximately $17,563.70 per month at a 6.5% interest rate. The
present value of $3,000,000 paid over 40 years with a 6.5% rate of return is $291,666.56.

~
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nearly three years beyond the original contract date and two years beyond the original
closing date was at odds with the parties' justified expectations.
II.

NYA WAS REQUIRED TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY WITHIN A
REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME

When a contract does not specify a time for performance, "the law implies that it
shall be done within a reasonable time under the circumstances." Coulter & Smith, 966
~

P.2d at 858; see also Kraatz v. Heritage Imps., 2003 UT App 201, ,r 27, 71 P.3d 188;
Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 204 (1981) ("When the parties to a ... contract
have not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights
and duties, a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.").
"An implied reasonable time limit is as much a part of the agreement as those terms that

\,jj)

are expressed." Coulter & Smith, 966 P.2d at 858. If the reasonable time for
performance under a contract is clear based on the undisputed facts, the Court may rule as
a matter oflaw. See IHC Health Servs. v. D&K Mgmt, Inc., 2008 UT 73, ,r 19, 196 P.3d
588 (holding that the district court may resolve fact-dependent questions on summary
judgment under appropriate circumstances); Contimortgage Corp. v. Mortgage Am., Inc.,
47 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("[T]he court may decide what is a reasonable
time as a matter of law ... where the time taken is clearly reasonable or unreasonable
that there can be no question of doubt as to the proper answer to the question.").
Here, the REPC stated a settlement deadline of October 31, 2007, but granted
"sole discretion" to NYA to extend that deadline an indefinite number of times in 30-day
increments. The district court incorrectly ruled that because NYA extended the
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unspecified closing deadline each time it made earnest money payments to the Harrisons,
that the REPC included a specific time for performance term of payment date plus 30
days. (R. 393-94.) On this ground, it declined to hold that NYA had an obligation to
close on the Property within a reasonable time. But the fact that NYA had to fulfill a
condition to maintain its indefinite time for performance does not somehow make the
time for performance definite. Under the district court's interpretation, without a
reasonableness term, NYA would be able to make interest-free payments on the property
for forty years. During this time, the Harrisons would not be permitted to alter the
Property in any way or to financially encumber it and would bear all costs of ownership.
It is for situations like this that the law supplies a reasonableness term for time for
performance, which the Court should supply here.
NYA's failure to close on the Property by August 5, 2009, can be determined as a
matter of law based on the following undisputed material facts: ( 1) The parties agreed to
a closing date of October 31, 2007 (Factual Background~ 6), with an unspecified number
of extensions thereafter; (2) In September 2007, NYA indicated to the Harrisons that
closing "shouldn't be too far into the future" (id~ 12); (3) NYA did not seek to terminate
or alter the contract during the Due Diligence Period to account for any kinks in its
development plan ; (4) The Harrisons notified NYA on March 5, 2009, that August 5,
2009 was a reasonable time for performance, which gave NYA five months to pull
together the necessary financing to close on the Property (id~ 15); and (5) the parties
agreed that time was of the essence in the performance of the REPC (id112).
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the denial of the Harrisons' motion for summary
18

judgment that NYA failed to close within a reasonable time. Alternatively, the Court
should remand this case to the district court for a factual determination of a reasonable
time to perform.
~

III.

THE DISPUTED EXTENSION PAYMENT WAS NOT VALID TENDER
Because NYA's Disputed Extension Payment was conditioned on the Harrisons'

acceptance ofNYA's interpretation of the REPC, it was not valid tender. Tender of
payment is not valid if it "impose[ s] on the other party a new condition or requirement
not already imposed by the contract." Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 846 P .2d 123 8,
\@)

1243 (Utah 1992). "The prohibition against conditional tender forbids the tendering
party from adding new noncontractual conditions or requirements for receiving the
tender." PDQ Lube Ctr. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792, 800 n.13 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also

Century 21 All W Real Estate and Inv. Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1982). If a
party accepts tender of payment offered with conditions it is statutorily "precluded from
objection afterwards." Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-802(3).
In Century 21, the Utah Supreme Court held that prospective buyers of real
property had not made valid tender of performance to purchase the property when they
sent a letter to the seller advising that they were "ready and willing to close on this
transaction" because the buyers concurrently insisted that the sellers accept their
interpretation of the contract's requirements as a condition of their performance. Century

21, 645 P .2d at 54-56. The contract in Century 21 was silent on the specific condition in
~

dispute. Id. On the other hand, in Kelley, where the contract explicitly required
marketable title, the court held that conditioning performance on the clearing of a cloud
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caused by a boundary dispute was not a conditional tender of performance. Kelley, 846
P.2d at 1243-44.
The district court held that the Disputed Extension Payment was "valid tender"
because the August 31 Letter "only contained conditions that NYA already had a right to
insist upon based on the REPC." (R. 390.) This was in error because the August 31
Letter adds terms not expressly included in the REPC and at odds with the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and the inherent term of a reasonable time for performance.
The REPC was silent on the economic feasibility of development or development
potential of the Property, the availability of the sewer line, and the storm drain capacity.
(Factual Background ifil 10-11.) Even if NYA had not breached the covenant at the time
of the Disputed Extension Payment, had the Harrisons accepted NY A's terms, NYA
could never breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by extending the closing
deadline as it pertains to time to complete the purchase of the Property. In entering the
REPC, the Harrisons never agreed that NYA could continue the closing date indefinitely
for any possible reason. They never agreed to a 40-year installment purchase during
which they would bear the costs of ownership with none of the benefits. NYA should not
be permitted to use the tender rule to circumvent the adjudication of a good faith dispute
over contractual terms.
Even if "sole discretion" can plausibly be read to encompass the additional
conditions imposed by the August 31 Letter (it cannot), the fact that the REPC is silent on
these conditions is sufficient for the Court to hold that the additional conditions
invalidated the tender. This is especially the case here because the Harrisons agreed to
20

accept the payment upon withdrawal of the conditions, an objection they were required to
make under Utah Code section 78B-5-802. Specifically, had the Harrisons not raised
their objections at the time NYA made the Disputed Extension Payment, they would have
vJ

been "precluded from objection afterwards." Utah Code § 78B-5-802(3 ). Under the
district court's ruling, the Harrisons were in an impossible position: either agree to
NYA's interpretation of the REPC, which meant giving up on their claims which were
already the subject of litigation, or risk the district court finding them in breach for
refusing the tender. This is an inappropriate use of the tender rule. Accordingly, the

~

Court should reverse the district court's denial of the Harrisons' summary judgment
motion and hold that the Disputed Extension Payment was not a valid tender, and NYA
has breached the REPC as a matter of law by failing to purchase the Property or make
Extension Payments.

IV.

THE HARRISONS DID NOT BREACH THE REPC BY REJECTING THE
DISPUTED EXTENSION PAYMENT
The Harrisons' refusal of the Disputed Extension Payment did not breach the

REPC even if the Harrisons' interpretation of the REPC ultimately turned out to be
wrong because the Harrisons remained willing to honor the contract. The district court
held that the Harrisons' refusal of the Disputed Extension Payment violated its
WiD

contractual obligation to accept Extension Payments and constituted a breach of the
contract. (R. 389-90.) This ruling was in error because the Harrisons never refused to
extend the closing deadline, only to accept the $6,250 payment to do so. Moreover, even
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if the refusal of a $6,250 payment was a breach of the REPC, in light of the $3,000,000
purchase price, it was not a material breach relieving NYA of performance.

A.

The Harrisons Remained Willing to Perform Under the REPC

Rejection of the Disputed Extension Payment was not a breach of the Harrisons'
contractual obligation because the Harrisons remained ready, willing, and able to sell the
Property, and never manifested a "positive and unequivocal intent" not to do so. Cobabe
v. Stanger, 844 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1992) (explaining the standard for anticipatory
repudiation). "[A]n anticipatory breach of contract is one committed before the time has
come when there is a present duty of performance, and is the outcome of words or acts
evincing an intention to refuse performance in the future." Clarke v. Living Scriptures,
Inc., 2005 UT App 225, ,I 13, 114 P.3d 602. As the district court correctly ruled, the
Harrisons' negotiation and litigation over the terms of the REPC were not a "positive and
unequivocai" statement that they would not abide by the terms of the REPC. The
Harrisons' willingness to abide by the terms of the REPC continued even after they
rejected the Disputed Extension Payment. The Disputed Extension Payment triggered the
Harrisons' obligation to sell the Property to NYA within the next thirty days. At no time
did the Harrisons repudiate this obligation, even in the face of what they considered a
default in NYA's Extension Payments. In fact, the Harrisons specifically informed NYA
at the time they returned the Disputed Extension Payment that they would "continue to
accept the monthly checks," indicating that they remained willing to perform their
contractual obligation. (Factual Background ,I 23.) Accordingly, the district court erred
in ruling that the Harrisons breached their contractual obligations by rejecting the

22

@

Disputed Extension Payment, and the Court should reverse the entry of summary
judgment against the Harrisons on this issue.

B.

Rejection of the Disputed Extension Payment Was Not a Material
Breach

Even if rejection of the Disputed Extension Payment was a breach of the REPC by
the Harrisons, it was not a material breach or a repudiation of the contract under these
i~

circumstances, and therefore did not excuse NYA's subsequent non-performance. Only
"substantial" or "material" breaches of a contract excuse performance by the nonbreaching party. Cross v. Olsen, 2013 UT App 135, ~ 26,303 P.3d 1030 (internal
citations omitted). A breach which is "incidental and subordinate to the main purpose of
the contract" is not material. Id.

i.i?;

~

27. "The relevant question is not whether the breach

goes to the heart of the provision breached, but whether it goes to the heart of the
contract." Id.

~

28. A district court considers the following factors when evaluating the

materiality of a breach:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit
which he reasonably expected; (b) the extent to which the injured party can
be adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be
deprived; (c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform will suffer forfeiture; (d) the likelihood that the party failing to
perform or to offer to perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the
circumstances including any reasonable assurances; (e) the extent to which
the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to perform comports
with standards of good faith and fair dealing.
Id. While the materiality of a breach is usually a question of fact, if the facts are

undisputed, it is a question oflaw. Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209
(Utah Ct. App. 1997).
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Considering these factors, the Harrisons did not materially breach the REPC as a
matter of law by returning the Disputed Extension Payment. There is no question based
on the Harri sons' response to the August 31 Letter that the Harrisons were still willing to
sell the property to NYA under the terms of the REPC. As a result, NYA was not
damaged by the Harrisons refusal of the Disputed Extension Payment. To the extent
NYA was damaged, such damage could be calculated in the context of the lawsuit that
was already proceeding at the time of the Disputed Extension Payment. Because the
Harrisons remained willing to honor their obligation to sell the Property to NYA-and
put that willingness in writing-neither party would suffer forfeiture as a result of the
Harrisons' return of the Disputed Extension Payment. The Harrisons remained at all
times willing to abide by the court's interpretation of the terms of the REPC. For the
same reasons, the Harrisons' conduct did not violate the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. In contrast, NYA's actions in conditioning the Disputed Extension Payment on
their interpretation of the contract were a clear violation of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Based on the undisputed facts, the Court should reverse the district court
and hold that the Harrisons' rejection of the Disputed Extension Payment was not
material and that NYA was required to continue to make Extension Payments under the
REPC. By failing to do so, NYA breached the REPC.

24

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should reverse the district court's grant of summary
judgment to NYA and denial of summary judgment to the Harrisons.

Respectfully submitted,
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EXHIBIT 1

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-802
Statutes current through the 2014 General Session

Utah Code Annotated > Title 78B Judicial Code > Chapter S Procedure and Evidence >
Part 8 Miscellaneous

788-5-802. Tender specific or waived.

Offer in writing sufficient -

Objection -

Must be

(1)

An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument or specific personal
property is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money, instrument, or
property.

(2)

The person to whom a tender is made shall, at the time, specify any objection to the money, instrument,
or property, or it is considered waived.

(3)

If the objection is to the amount of money, the terms of the instrument or the amount or kind of property,
the person shall specify the amounts, terms, or kind which is required, or be precluded from objection
afterwards.

History
L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-27-1; C. 1953, 78-27-1; renumbered by L 2008. ch. 3. § 834.

·~

Annotations

Notes
Amendment Notes. -

..:J

The 2008 amendment, effective February 7, 2008, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as
§ 78-27-1, and added the (1) designation and (2) and (3).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Ability to make tender good.
Conditions.
Extinguishing lien.
Foreclosure.
Interest.
Tender.
-By check.
-By mail.
-To attorney.
SHANNON MACAULEY
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Ability to make tender good.
Under this section, where a person makes a tender in writing, he is excused from actually producing the money at
the time of making the tender, but the statute excuses no other act or requirement on his part which would be
necessary to make a valid tender, independently of the statute. To have the effect of a valid tender, the party
tendering must have the ability to produce it, and must act in good faith. Nor does such a tender deprive the creditor
of the allowance of a reasonable time in which to ascertain the amount due, and to determine whether he will
accept; and if he accepts, and debtor fails to produce the money, his tender will be of no avail. Hvams v.
Bamberger. 10 Utah 3, 36 P. 202, 1894 Utah LEXIS 1 (Utah 1894).
Plaintiff did not make a valid tender because it failed to fulfill a condition of the cashier's check, and the defendant
need not have objected to the tender of the check to prevail. PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 949 P. 2d 792 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997).

Conditions.
A tender, to be good, must be free from any condition which the tenderer does not have a right to insist upon.
Sieverts v. White, 273 P.2d 974, 2 Utah 2d 351. 1954 Utah LEXIS 219 (Utah 1954).

Extinguishing lien.
Valid tender made by pledger of personal property at any time before sale will have the effect of extinguishing
pledgee's lien. Hyams v. Bamberger. 10 Utah 3, 36 P. 202, 1894 Utah LEXIS 1 (Utah 1894).
In action against tractor dealer who wrongfully held plaintiff's tractor demanding the amount due on plaintiff's open
account plus the amount of repairs, the evidence showed that the defendant was so adamant in its position that a
tender of the amount of repairs would have been a "fruitless gesture" and, thus, plaintiff was excused from making
the tender because it would have been useless. Jenkins v. Equipment Ctr.• 232 Utah Adv. 48, 869 P. 2d 1000, 1994
Utah App. LEXIS 19 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied sub. nom., Jenkins v. Hesston 242 Utah Adv. 55, 879 P.2d 266.
1994 Utah LEXIS 111 (Utah 1994).

Foreclosure.
In action to foreclose real estate contract, a valid tender of all existing delinquencies prevents plaintiff from
foreclosing on the mortgage and note. Romero v. Schmidt, 392 P.2d 37, 15 Utah 2d 300, 1964 Utah LEXIS 252
(Utah 1964J.

Interest.
If tender is made of full face of account, and no demand for interest is made, interest, at least for the purposes of
a tender, is waived. Hirsh v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co.• 48 Utah 434. 160 P. 283. 1916 Utah LEXIS 43 (Utah
1916).

Tender.

-By check.
Where a tender is made by check, the person to whom it is tendered must specify his objections or he will be
deemed to have waived all objections, except such as he insists upon when tender is made. Hirsh v. Ogden Furn.
& Carpet Co.• 48 Utah 434. 160 P. 283 (1916). See also Ulibarri v. Christenson. 275 P.2d 170, 2 Utah 2d 367. 1954
Utah LEXIS 224 (Utah 1954).
A check for the amount due, presented within time and when no exception is taken to the form of the tender, is a
valid and legal tender of the amount due, but only when there are adequate funds in the account of the drawer to
SHANNON MACAULEY
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pay such check upon presentation in due course. Sieverls v. White. 273 P2d 974, 2 Utah 2d 351. 1954 Utah LEXIS
219 (Utah 1954).
Plaintiff did not make a valid tender because it failed to fulfill a condition of the cashier's check, and the defendant
need not have objected to the tender of the check to prevail. PDQ Lube Ctr.• Inc. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997).

-By mail.
Tender of check by mail is good tender in absence of special objections. Hirsh v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co.,
48 Utah 434. 160 P. 283. 1916 Utah LEXIS 43 (Utah 1916).

-To attorney.
~

A tender to an attorney with authority to collect is the same as though made to creditor himself. Hirsh
Furniture & Carpet Co., 48 Utah 434. 160 P 283, 1916 Utah LEXIS 43 (Utah 1916).

Research References & Practice Aids
_;;;

Cross-References. Settlement offers, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 68.
Uniform Commercial Code, Sales, tender of payment, § l0A-2-511.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS
FORSUMMARYJUDGMENT

NEW YORK AVE., LLC, a Utah limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

vs.
Date: June 14, 2012
DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual,

Case No: 090402295
Judge David N. Mortensen

Defendants.

1bis matter is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment. The motion were
fully briefed and argued before the court on April 19, 2012. The court has been fully informed
and for reasons more fully set forth below denies defendant's motion and grants plaintiff's
motion in part.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A motion for summmy judgment will be granted where "the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law," and "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[A]n adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id at (e).
-1-

Additionally, the court "will view the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion." Brower'v. Brown, 144 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Utah 1987).

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

NYA is a Utah limited liability company doing business in Utah County, Utah. Steven

Kelly is the registered agent and manager of NYA.
2.

The Hanisons are the owners of over 20 acres of real property located at approximately

950 West 700 South in the Springville, Utah (the "Property").
3.

On or about November 10, 2006, the parties entered into a real estate purchase contract
("REPC") whereby NYA agreed to purchase the Property for $3 million.

4.

Addendum #1, signed along with the REPC, provided that the Settlement Deadline
wasl80 days from the date of the fully executed contract.

5.

Addendwn # 1 provided as follows:
"The Buyer may choose, at his sole discretion, to pay an additional amount of non~
refundable earnest money to continue the contract monthly after the settlement deadline.
This additional money will be paid monthly at a rate of $12,500 per month, and will be a
credit towards the purchase price at closing."

6.

On November 22, 2006, the parties entered into Addendum #2.

7.

Addendum #2 provided that the "settlement deadline is to be extended until after the

harvest season 2007 which will be October 31, 2007."
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8.

Addendum #2 reduced the Extension Payments to $6,250 per month and required the
Harrisons to include 20.27 water shares with the purchase.

9.
149

The parties have not agreed in writing to a limitation on the number of extensions of the
settlement deadline that NYA may secure by timely payment of the Extension Payment.

10.

The REPC and addenda provided that the initial earnest money deposit of $10,000 along
with the monthly Extension Payments all constitute non•refundable earnest money that

~

would have been applied to the purchase price at closing.
11.

The parties have not entered into any addenda to the REPC other than Addendum #1 and
Addendum #2 nor any other written agreements modifying the REPC.

VJ)

12.

REPC Addendwn #2 states that the "date of the fully executed contract is to be the latest
signature date on this Addendwn #2," which is November 22, 2006.

13.

Section 21 of the REPC states that "Time is of the Essence."

14.

Under the terms of the REPC, NYA had 90 days from the date of the fully executed
contract to conduct due diligence (the "Due Diligence Deadline").

15.

If, prior to the Due Diligence Deadline, NYA determined that the results of its due

diligence were unacceptable, it could choose to cancel the contract or to provide written

notice to the Harrisons of its objections.
16.

After the Due Diligence Deadline the earnest money was "deemed earned and nonrefundable thereafter if Buyer fails to close for any reason."
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17.

On January 30, 2007, Mr. Kelly wrote a letter to the Harrisons informing them of a
problem connecting the Property to the Springville sewer system. He further stated:
"It looks like I won't be able to develop the property until mid-2008 at the earliest.
However, I like the property and want to continue the contract as it is currently
written ... On October 31st I will start making the monthly payments to you that we agreed
upon until I close the property, which will be when the sewer trunk line is installed and I
can get the necessary approvals from the city to develop."

18.

On September 19, 2007, Mr. Kelly wrote a letter to the Harrisons updating them on his
progress in developing the Property. Specifically, he informed them that he had found a
way to work around the problem with connecting to the Springville sewer system. He
further stated, "I will be paying the extension fees as outlined in the purchase contract
until I close. It shouldn't be too far into the future."

19.

In October 2007, NYA began making the monthly Extension Payments in accordance

with the tenns of the REPC and its addenda.
20.

In early 2008, Mr. Kelly attempted to get approval from Springville City to work around
the sewer trunk line issue.

21.

In April 2008, Mr. Kelly disclosed to his site engineer Brian Gabler that "[W]e are
holding off pursuing this at the current time."

22.

In July 2008, Mr. Harrison informed Mr. Kelly that he did not want to wait any longer for
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NYA to close.
23.

In December 2008, Mr. Harrison began discussing with Mr. Kelly his options for
tenninating the contract. The parties did not come to an agreement.

24.

On March 5, 2009, the Harrisons through their attorney, Steve Newman, sent a letter to
NYA stating that it had been 16 months since the original Settlement Deadline and that
any reasonable time for closing had passed.

25.

The March S, 2009 letter asserted that NYA was in breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, but that the Harrisons were willing to close on or before
August 5, 2009.

26.

The March 5, 2009 letter asserted that if not closed by August 5, 2009, the Harrisons

reserved all their rights and remedies under the REPC.
27.

On April 22, 2009, NYA's counsel sent a letter that stated, "My clients have the right to
continue making the Extension Payments under the Contract, without an arbitrary and
artificial August 5, 2009 deadline."

28.

NYA did not agree in writing, or otherwise, to the August 5, 2009 closing date.

29.

On May 14, 2009, after a failed settlement negotiation, the Harrisons infonned NYA that
it expected it to continue to perform its obligations Wlder the REPC.

30.

On August 31, 2009, NYA's counsel sent Harrison's counsel the Extension Payment

along with a letter that contained that following:
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(a) The purchase price for the property was based on the assumption that it could be
developed as single family residential that would maximize the development potential of
the land based on the zoning laws in place that govern the subject property. With the lack
of sewer capabilities, and through further information garnered through the development
process that showed insufficient stonn drainage capacity, the property could not (at the
time) be developed to its maximum potential.

(b) The ability to postpone closing on the property until it could be developed to its

maximum potential was crucial to my clients. Accordingly, Extension Payments were "a
credit towards the purchase price" of the property as stated in the REPC and was in no
way to be considered "rent" or an interest payment.

(c) The closing deadline was being extended and the Extension Payment reduced in part
to account for the fact that, since the sewer was not readily available, it might be some
time before the property could be developed as anticipated.

(d) The REPC could be extended, at [NYA's] discretion as stated in the REPC, to allow
for the property to be developed to its full potential. This includes, but is not limited to:

sewer line extension installed to the property, storm drainage readily available, and
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property being economically feasible to develop under zoning ordinance of Springville
City and existing market conditions.
31.

The August 2009 letter accompanying the Extension Payment stated, "Nothing in this
letter should be construed as a demand by [Plaintiff] for any rights or benefits other than
those provided under the REPC."

32.

The Harrisons refused to accept the August 2009 Extension Payment as presented and in
a letter from their counsel to NYA's counsel stated, "[Y]our attempt to modify the terms

of the [REPC] and to make the negotiation of the monthly check conditioned upon your
client's unilateral and unexpressed intentions and 'understanding' is not only
inappropriate, but constitutes a further breach of the parties' [REPC.]"
33.

The Harrisons informed NYA that they would "continue to accept the monthly checks so
long as [NYA] withdraw [its] inappropriate conditions."

34.

NYA has not closed on the Property and has not made or attempted to make any
extension payments since August 2009.
ANALYSIS

1.

Time of Performance

The Harrisons argue that NYA breached by failing to perform within a reasonable time.
"[I]f a contract fails to specify a time of performance the law implies that it shall be done within
a reasonable time under the circumstances." Coulter & Smith Ltd v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852,858
(Utah 1998) (citing Watson v. Hatch, 728 P.2d 989,990 (Utah 1986)). "When the parties to a
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bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which is
essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the
circumstances is supplied by the court." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204. A court "may
allow a contract to be performed within a reasonable time only when the contract is silent as to
the time for its performance." Watson v. Hatch. 728 P.2d 989,990 (Utah 1986).
The parties explicitly agreed in the REPC and the addenda that the settlement deadline
would be October 31, 2007 ... They also agreed that NYA "may choose, at its sole discretion, to

pay an additional amount of non-refundable earnest money to continue the contract monthly after
the settlement deadline." Therefore, each monthly extension payment extended the settlement
deadline to the end of the following month.
The Hanisons use the Tenth Circuit case Navair, Inc. v. /FR Americas, Inc. (utilizing
Kansas law) to assert that the reasonable time requirement still applies even if the contract
contains a specific date for performance that has been extended. 519 F.3d 1131, 1138 (10th Cir.
2008). The Navair case is distinguishable from the present case. Navair involved a contractual
dispute regarding the length of time an oral extension of the contract was valid for. The present
case involves a contract which clearly states that extensions will be allowed and each extension
will continue the contract monthly after the settlement deadline. Unlike Navair, there is no
ambiguity regarding the extension of the contract deadline so long as a valid tender of extension
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payment was made. Because the contract specified a time for performance, the court cannot
impose a reasonable time.
The Harrisons contend that allowing NYA to continue making the extension payments
indefinitely would lead to absurd results in that it would allow NYA to make interest-free
payments for 40 years until the extension payments amounted to the purchase price. The

Harrisons meanwhile would be forced to continue paying the carrying costs including property
taxes. The Harrisons further argue that this could not have been the original intention of the
parties because the parties did not execute the standard Seller Financing Addendum nor indicate
anywhere in the REPC that they intended to create a seller-financed transaction.
The Utah Supreme Court held in, Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larken-Gifford-Overton, LLC, that
"[w]here the language within the four comers of the contract is unambiguous, the parties'

intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract
may be interpreted as a matter oflaw." 207 P.3d 1235, 1240 (Utah 2009). "Only if the language
of the contract is ambiguous will we consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent." Id
The evidence before the court shows that the parties agreed to the extension payment
clause of the contract. Addendum # 1 of the REPC specifically states that NYA "may choose, at
his sole discretion, to pay an additional amount of non-refundable earnest money to continue the
contract monthly after the settlement deadline." It does not limit the number of times that the
extension payments may be made, only that it is in NYA's sole discretion. The wording is clear
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and unambiguous; therefore, NYA was entitled to extend the settlement deadline so long as valid
tender of the extension payment was made.
NYA's statements in letters sent to the Harrisons regarding the time frame for settling
constitute extrinsic evidence and cannot be considered by the court in determining if the contract
contained a specific time for performance.
2.

Anticipatory Breach

NYA claims that the Harrisons anticipatorily breached the contract by asserting that NYA
was in default and demanding closing occur on August 5, 2009. As evidence of anticipatory
breach, NYA points to comments made by Mr. Harrison to the effect that he wanted his $3
million and that he was not willing to wait around anymore. On March 5, 2009, the Harrisons'
attorney sent a letter to NYA stating that it had been 16 months since the original settlement
deadline and that any reasonable time for closing had passed. NYA claims that this letter implied
that NYA was in breach of its performance under the REPC. The letter also stated that the
Harrisons were willing to close on or before August 5, 2009, and that ifNYA did not close by
that date then the Harrisons reserved all their rights and remedies under the REPC. In addition,
NYA points to the Harrisons' answers to the amended complaint in this action. Lastly, NYA
points to the Harrisons' refusal to accept the August 31, 2009 Extension Payment as evidence of
anticipatory breach.
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"An anticipatory breach of contract is one committed before the time has come when

there is a present duty of performance, and is the outcome of words or acts evincing an intention
to refuse perfonnance in the future." Upland Industries Corp. v. P. Gamble Robinson Co., 684
\~

P.2d 63 8, 643 (Utah 1984). An anticipatory breach occurs only if a party to a contract "manifests
a positive and unequivocal intent not to render its promised perfonnance." Cobabe v. Stanger,

844 P.2d 298,303 (Utah 1992).
The Harrisons did not anticipatorily breach the contract. Although the Harrisons
demanded that NYA close on or before August 5, 2009 and Mr. Harrison expressed his desire to
either close or have NYA stop payments, these facts, especially viewed in a light most favorable
to the Harrisons, do not "manifest a positive and unequivocal intent not to render [their]
promised performance." Id The Harrisons' statements, the letter and the pleadings are better
described as negotiation and litigation techniques, not a manifestation of their intention to refuse
future performance.
3.

The August 31, 2009 Extension Payment Constituted Valid Tender

The letter accompanying the August 2009 Extension Payment lists the reasons why NYA

originally intended to purchase the Property, namely, to develop for single-family residential
homes; and the reasons why NYA has faced delays in readying the Property for development,
namely, the sewer capabilities and storm drainage. Section (d) of the letter states:
"The REPC could be extended, at my client's discretion as stated in the
REPC, to allow for the property to be developed to its full potential. This
-11-

includes, but is not limited to: sewer line extension installed to the property,
storm drainage readily available, and property being economically feasible to
develop under zoning ordinances of Springville City and existing market
conditions."
The Hanisons claim that NYA breached the express tenns of the REPC by making the
~i

August 2009 Extension Payment contingent on the Harrisons' acceptance of additional terms and
failing to make any subsequent Extension Payments.
"In order to be valid, tender of payment of money due must be ... unconditional." PDQ

Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber 949 P.2d 792, 800 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "A tender, to be good, must be
free from any condition which the tenderer does not have a right to insist upon." Sieverts v.

White, 2 Utah 2d 351,273 P.2d 974 (Utah 1954). "The tender cannot impose on the other party a
new condition or requirement not already imposed by the contract." Kelley v. Leucadia Financial

Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992).
The August 2009 Extension Payment only contained conditions that NYA already had a
right to insist upon based on the REPC, and therefore the extension payment was unconditional.
The REPC does not explicitly state that closing would take place when it is economically feasible
to develop, or based on the sewer line availability, storm drainage issues, or when the property
could be developed to its maximum potential. The contract does, however, allow for extensions
according to the Buyer's sole discretion. NYA's letter to the Harrisons noting its reasons for
making the Extension Payments was a display of its discretion. The reasons for extending the

closing are irrelevant inasmuch as those reasons flesh out NYA's discretion. The letter did not
... 12-
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add additional terms to the contract because according to the contract, NYA has the right to
extend at its discretion. NYA's letter required the Harrisons to acknowledge rights that the
contract had already granted to NYA; therefore, the August 2009 Extension Payment cannot be
viewed as an invalid tender of payment. The Harrisons therefore breached the contract by
refusing the valid tender.

When the Harrisons refused the August extension payment they told NYA that they
would accept the extension payments so long as they were not accompanied by additional
conditions. They claim that because NYA failed to tender any other payments that NYA was in
breach of the REPC. "[U]nder the 'first breach' rule 'a party first guilty of a substantial or
material breach of contract cannot complain if the other party thereafter refuses to perfonn. He
can neither insist on performance by the other party nor maintain an action against the other party

for a subsequent failure to perform."' CCD, L. C. v. Millsap, 116 P.3d 366, 373 (Utah 2005)

(quoting Jackson v. Rich, 28 Utah 2d 134,499 P.2d 279,280 (1972)).
Because the Harrisons refused the valid tender of the August 2009 Extension Payment,
NYA's refusal to make any further extension payments is not a "failure to perform." The
Hanisons were the first party to breach the contract and "cannot ~:mmplain if the other party
(NYA) thereafter refuses to perform." Id
A final note as to the August tender: the court did not give credence to the language in the
letter accompanying the August tender which stated ''Nothing in this letter should be construed
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as a demand by [NYA] for any rights or benefits other than those provided under the REPC."
Although the court agrees with this statement, the court was not influenced by it. If the letter had
in fact required the Harrisons to agree to additional terms, the statement would have carried no
weight so the court analyzed the letter without regard to that statement. .
4.

Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The Utah Supreme Court, in U.S. Fidelity v. U.S. Sports Specialty, defines the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing as "a duty not to intentionally or purposely do anything [that] will
destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract and to ... act
consistently with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party."

U.S. Fid v. U.S. Sports Specialty, 270 P.3d 464,470 (Utah 2012).
Utah looks to the justified expectations of the parties to determine breach of good faith
and fair dealing. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991 ).

This requires the court to look beyond the terms of the contract because an examination of
contract terms alone is insufficient to determine the justified expectations of the parties. Id
However, "[n]o such covenant may be invoked ... if it would create obligations inconsistent with
express contractual terms." Young Living Essential Oils, LC v. Marin, 266 P.3d 814, 110 (Utah
2011). "While a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every contract, ... this
covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights or duties to which the parties did
not agree ex ante." Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226, ,r 45 (Utah 2004).
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NYA has presented facts that it intended to extend the contract until it could develop the
property and the Harrisons have brought forth facts that show they wanted a speedy closing. Thus
there is a fact issue as to the parties' justified expectations. In addition, the Harrison's claim as to
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is denied because the contract granted NYA
the right to the extensions according to NYA's sole discretion and to find them in breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing would be inconsistent with the express tenns of the
contract and would be the enforcement of duties to which the parties did not initially agree to.
5.

Additional Earnest Money Deposits Apply to the Purchase Price

NYA seeks a swnmary declaratory judgment that the Additional Earnest Money Deposits
apply to the purchase price. Addendum #2 changed the amount of the monthly extension
payment from $12,500 to $6,250; nothing in Addendwn #2 changed the provision that the
Additional Earnest Money Deposits were to be applied to the purchase price at closing. The
Harrisons do not dispute this claim and state that they have never disputed this claim during the
course of this litigation. NYA is therefore entitled to declaratory judgment that the Additional
Earnest Money Deposits be applied to the purchase price.

6.

No Limitation on the Number of Extension Payments

The REPC does not expressly limit the number of extension payments that the Buyer is
entitled to so long as the $6,250 extension payment is timely made. "A contract should be
reformed only when its terms are so vague that the intention of the parties cannot be ascertained
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therefrom." Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 511 P.2d 737, 739 (Utah 1973). Placing a limit
on the number of extension payments allowed would be refonning the contract and thereby
rewriting the parties' agreement. The contract in this case is clear, and NYA is entitled to
declaratory judgment that the REPC does not limit the number of extensions to which Plaintiff is
entitled when it timely pays the Extension Payments.
7.

Motion to Strike

Defendants moved to strike portions of the Steven Kelly affidavit. While the motion was
well-taken, the issue is ultimateiy moot because the court did not rely on paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 10 or
13 of the affidavit in ruling on this matter.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Utah in Carlson v. Hamilton said, "People should be entitled to

contract on their own terms without the indulgence of paternalism by courts in the alleviation of
one side or another from the effects of a bad bargain. Also, they should be permitted to enter into
contracts that actually may be Wll"easonable or which may lead to hardship on one side." 332
P.2d 989, 990-91 (Utah 1958); See also Johnston v. Austin, 748 P.2d 1084, 1089 (Utah 1988)
(holding that courts should intervene and alter the contractual provisions only when the
enforcement of the terms of the uniform real estate contract would be unconscionable). Though
the Harrisons argue that allowing for indefinite extension payments would lead to absurd results,
the courts may not step in to alleviate the effects of a bad bargain.
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The contract in this case provides for a specific time of performance; therefore, this court
cannot imply a reasonable time of performance. While the Harrisons' actions prior to August of
2009 did not manifest anticipatory repudiation of the contract, the Hanisons refusal to accept the
August 2009 Extension Payment was an actual breach of the contract. Since the Harrisons
breached the contract first by refusing a valid tender, they cannot then claim a breach by NYA in
failing to perform. Because the Harrisons breached, NYA is entitled to its contractual remedies.
Plaintiff's motion for swnmary judgment is granted as to au· claims except for the claim
that the defendants breached the agreement anticipatorily, and Defendants' motion for swnmary
judgment is denied. Additionally, Plaintifrs motion for partial declaratory summary judgment is
granted in that the Additional Earnest Money Deposits apply to the purchase price and
Defendants may not limit the number of extensions to which Plaintiff is entitled when it timely
pays the Additional Earnest Money Deposits. Plaintiff's counsel will draft an order consistent

with this ruling.
Dated this 14th day of June 2012.

BY THE COURT:

-Judge David N. Mortensen

Fourth Judicial District Court
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NEW YORK AVE., LLC, a Utah limited
liability company,

ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant,
Case No. 090402295

vs.

Judge: David N. Mortensen

DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual,
Defendants and
Counterclaimants.

This matter having come before the Court for hearing on April 19, 2012 on Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment and on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties
were represented by counsel. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, affidavits
and other evidence present and on file, having heard the parties arguments, and otherwise being

fully advised in the premises, issued its Ruling on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. Based
on the Court's Ruling on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment the Court now enters the
following:

ORDER
1.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

2.

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to NYA 's Second Claim for

Relief for Breach of REPC is granted, except for the claim of that Defendants anticipatorily
breached the REPC, and Plaintiff is entitled to its contractual remedies.
3.

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Third Claim for

Relief for Declaratory Judgment is granted and iti is hereby ordered that the Additional Earnest
Money Deposits be applied to the purchase price under the REPC and that the REPC does not
limit the number of extensions to which Plaintiff is entitled when it timely pays the Extension
Payments ..
4.

Because the Harrisons breached, Plaintiff is entitled to its contractual remedies.

However, the previous ruling of the court did not determine the amount of Plaintiffs damages.
The issue of the amount of Plaintiffs damages, costs and attorneys fees is reserved at this time

to be the subject of further motions or trial.

Dated and signed this Sltay of

b,u . . 201:z,;... Ort. :--.~~-·~*:!;::\
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Judge~ -;fuMortensen _
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Mark Gaylord
Jason D. Boren
BALLARD SPAHR, LLP
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REAL

ADDENDUM NO. 1
TO
ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

TH'5 IS AN ADDENDUM to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE GONTRACT (the •REPC") with m,
Offer Reference Date of November 9. 2006 between Ne'N York Ave. I.LC. as Buyer. and Hanison. D,,vid ~
Jan, as Sal1er, regarding the Property, 20.27 Acres off 950 Wand app~mately 700 Sin Springville, lJl ·
Parcef #26:041:0031, Springville, utah 84663. The following terms are hereby incorporated a.c:. part of IM
REPC:

1.

Seller disclosure: deadline to be 14 days from date of fulJy executed contract.

2.

Due diligence deadllne to be 90 days from date of fully executed contract to do any and all due
di\ig~ '\ha\ '\hr: buyer deems n~~-ary or prudent \o de\:erm\ne, 'lht1\. '\he: property \s. ~a,\i~iac\o\"'j 101 ·. ·
Buyer's intended use. The due diligenee approval shall be at the buyer's sole and absolute discretion.

3.

Setliement deadfine to be 180 days from date offully ~ecuted contract

4_

$3,000,000 purchase price is based on the assumption thet the property contains 20.27 Acres, which ·
equates to $143,002 per acre. If the exact acreage Is more or less than 20.27 acres the purchose price _

~

~_:-:_-

will Increase or decrease accordingly based on $148,002 per acre.

'vtil

5.

Buyer wifl deposit the eamest money with First American Tith, Company Jocated in Orem. Utah, within s_ ·
business days from the date of a fully execuled contract
_::,..,.·. ·.

6.

Buyer to pay Sellers closing costs not to exceed $10,000.

7.

Seller agrees to sign within a reasonabfe time period all pertinent applications and documents required
for governmental approval of Buyer's proposed development

8.

Seller agrees to give ac:ccss to the Property during duyfight hours for any testing, rnspectlons,
surveying, and other similar secvfces for developing the Property, as the Buyer deems necessary. If
any type of large motorized equipment will be brought onto the property it will b8 coordinated through
the currant lessee of the property as to minimize the impact on the current crop.

9.

Buyer wm be deemed to have approved the Property if the Guyer has not terminated this agreement by
th~ Due Diffgence Deadline. The day folfowing the Due Diligence Deadline, the title company will
disperse the earnest money to tt,e Seifer. This earnest money wrn then be deemed earned and norr
refundable thereafter If Buyer fans to close for any reason. Released earnest money Is the sole remedy
to the Seller tf tfla Buyer faUs to close for any reason.

vJ

~

:_

earnest,.

1o. The Buyer may choose. at hfs sore discretion. to pay an addilionaf amount of nolHefrmdable
money to continue the e9nhact monthly after the sefflement deadline.. This adrfifional moneywill be pat

(!

monfhly at a rate of $12,500 per month, and wm be a crecfrttowards the p~asa price at closing_

;_

~

11. ff Buyer tenninates ttiis transaction for any reason, Buyer WJ1l tum over au surveys, engineering, soi
reports-, phase 1 reporf:s. efo. that may have been compfeted at no additior;ftostto lhe Setler.
.
.

£',

r
.·
~~

Seller shall have until 5:00 PM Mountain TI me_ November 1B, 2006, to accept fue terms of this AODENOUif:~
NO. 1 ln acoordanc-e With the provisions of Section 23 qf the REPC. Un fess so accepted, .the offer as
forth Jn this AODe.,DUM NO. 1 shall lt:Ipse.
·

set:·:•
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AOOENDUM NO. Z
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
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EXHIBIT 7
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ATLANTA, GA
BALTIMORE, MD
BETHESDA, MD
DENVER, CO
LAS VEGAS, NV
LOS ANGELES, CA
PHILADELPHIA, PA
PHOENIX, AZ
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
VOORHEES, NJ
WASHINGTON, DC
WILMINGTON, DE

STEVEN J. NEWMAN
DIRECT DIAL:

(801) 517-6878

PERSONAL FAX: (801) 596-6878
E-MAIL: NEWMANS@BALLARDSPAHR.COM

March 5, 2009

Via Federal Express and E-mail kkelly@rgn.com
Keith A. Kelly, Esq.
Ray Quinney & Nebeker
PO Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") between David and Jan Harrison
("Seller") and New York Ave., LLC {"Buyer")

Dear Mr. Kelly:
My firm has been retained to represent the Seller in connection with the matter
referenced above. Please advise the Buyer that the Seller: (i) is not willing to terminate the
contract pursuant to the terms set forth in your letter to Seller dated February 17, 2009; and (ii)
does not agree with your characterization of the facts concerning the REPC as set forth in your
letter.
After reviewing the REPC, we have determined that the Due Diligence Deadline
has expired and, while the Buyer has the right to extend the Settlement Date by making an
Extension Payment each month, the REPC is silent as to an outside Settlement Date and is
therefore silent as to when Buyer's performance under the REPC must occur. It is unreasonable
to interpret the extension provision in the REPC as allowing the Buyer to extend the Settlement
indefinitely. It is well established in Utah that when a contract fails to specify a time by which a
certain act must be performed, law implies that the act must be done within a reasonable time
under the circumstances. See Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 at 1242. It has been
over 16 months since the original Settlement Deadline, Buyer has not closed on the purchase of
the property, and any reasonable time for closing has already passed.
We view Buyer's failure to close as a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Notwithstanding this breach, Seller is willing to close on or before August
5, 2009. Otherwise, Seller reserves all of Seller's rights and remedies set forth in the REPC.
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At your earliest convenience, please call me to discuss a reasonable Settlement
Deadline.
Very truly yours,

Steven J. Newman
SJN/sjn
cc:
David and Jan Harrison (via fax)
Chris Anderson
(via e-mail)
· Steven Kelly
(via fed-ex)
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RAY QUINNEY

&

NEBEKER

ATTORN[YS AT LAW
Clark r. Giles
Narr'l/cl L Hall
Ooui:las W Morrison
llcrhcrt C. Livsey
D Ja1 Curtis

August 31, 2009

l.ilrry G Moore
tlrucc L Olson

Via Hand-Delivery, Email & Tele/ax
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SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE

PO Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0385
36 South State Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah
·,..:}

84111

801 532-1500 m
801 532-7543 FAX

John A A:lams
Douglas M Mori!.011
C,,1rg Garl1lu
Jeffrey W. l\11pel
Ellen J D Toscano
Kevin G. Glade
Lester K. Essig
Ira
Rubir.feld
Stephen C. lingey
John R Madsen
Kerth A. Kelly
Michael W. Spence
Scott A 1-!dgen
Ma,k M. Bctlilyon
Rick L Rose
Ric~ B. llog_1;ard

Mark R. Gaylord
Jason D. Boren
Steven J. Newman
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP
Suite 800
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2221

e

Lisa A. 'l'erkovith

flreol D. Wrrdc
Mrc~ael C Blue
S!Nen W. C31l
f.lainr. A. Monson
Ma,k A Cotler

www.rqn.com
PROVO OFFICE

86 North University Ave.
Suite 430

·-d

Provo, Utah

84601-4420

Re:

Real Estate Purchase Contract between
David and Jan Harrison, and New York Ave., LLC
Extension Payment for August of 2009

Dear Mark, Jason & Steven:
As you are aware, I represent New York Ave, LLC, regarding the Real
Estate Purchase Contract for Land ("REPC"), between your clients, David and
Jan Harrison ("the Harrisons" or "Sellers"), and New York Ave, LLC ("my
client'' or "Buyer"). Originally, your clients the Harrisons signed the REPC on
November 10, 2006, and they signed addenda #1 and #2 on November 10, 2006
and November 22, 2006, respectively. The REPC involved the sale of your
clients' property located at approximately 950 W. and 700 S., Springville, UT,
also known as parcel #26-041-0031, on November 10, 2006. This REPC is the
subject of a lawsuit entitled New York Ave., LLC v. DavidD. & Jan. C.
Harrison, Case No. 090402295 (Utah 4th D. Court) ("NYv. Harrison").
The REPC contains a clause with a due diligence period of90 days in
which my client had the ability to cancel the REPC at its discretion. The REPC
also contains a clause, paragraph 10 in Addendum No. 1, that allows my client
to extend the settlement deadline at monthly increments by paying an
"additional amount of non-refundable earnest money" ("Extension
Payment(s)") that would "be a credit towards the purchase price at closing."
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Grcp.P,OfY J Savar,e
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As you lmow, during the due diligence period, my client learned that the
city sewer was not available to service this property, thus making development
of this property not economically feasible at the time at the current purchase
price. It was possible that development would not be economically feasable for
a number of years at the current purchase price. Therefore, prior to the end of
the 90 day due diligence period, the REPC was renegotiated as memorialized in
Addendum No. 2, dated November 22, 2006. At the time of the signing of
addendum #2, my client made your clients aware that the sewer was not
available to the property as originally anticipated. Therefore, the contract was
amended due to the fact that the property could not be developed as originally
anticipated.
Addendum No. 2, among other things, extended the settlement deadline
to October 31, 2007, included 20.27 water shares in the sale, and reduced the
monthly Extension Payment from $12,500 to $6,250, based on the
understanding that it could take several years before this deal could be closed.
This amendment was also based upon my client's understanding that:
(a)

The purchase price for the property was .based on the
assumption that it could be developed as single family
residential that would maximize the development potential of
the land based on the zoning laws in place that govern the
subject property. With the lack of sewer capabilities, and
through further information garnered through the
development process that showed insufficient storm drainage
capacity, the property could not (at the time) be developed to
its maximum potential.

(b)

The ability to postpone closing on the property until it could
be developed to its maximum potential was crucial to my
clients. Accordingly, Extension Payments were "a credit
towards the purchase price" of the property as stated in the
REPC and was in no way to be considered "rent,, or an
interest payment.

(c)

The closing deadline was being extended and Extension
Payment reduced in part to account for the fact that, since the
sewer was not readily available, it might be some time before
the property could be developed as anticipated.

(d)

The REPC could be extended, at my client's discretion as
stated in the REPC, to allow for the property to be developed
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to its full potential. This includes, but is not limited to: ~ewer
line extension installed to the property, storm drainage
readily available, and property being economically feasible to
develop under zoning ordinances of Springville city and
existing market conditions.
My client has deposited $6,250 with First American Title Company on
or before the last day of each and every month since the settlement deadline
noted in Addendum No. 2, thereby extending the settlement deadline every
month since that settlement deadline. You have denied this point, apparently
claiming each such payment has not been made. This denial is found in
paragraph 19 of your Answer ("Answer") filed in NY v. Harrison.
My client has performed and is continuing to perform under the parties'
REPC. Accordingly, my client hereby provides you with the $6,250 August
2009 Extension Payment. We invite you to carefully discuss with your clients
what they understood was the purpose of Amendment No. 2 to the REPC. fu
negotiating this $6,250 check, you are agreeing with my client that it is entitled
under the REPC to make these payments in order to postpone closing in
accordance with the express terms of the REPC until it is economically feasible
to move forward with a residential development of the property as discussed
above, including in paragraphs {a) through (d). My client is simply seeking the
benefit of its bargain under the REPC, and nothing more - in light of your
claims that my client may not now close under the REPC. Nothing in this letter
should be construed as a demand by my clients for any rights or benefits other
than those provided under the REPC.

I look forward to discussing this matter with you further in an attempt to
resolve your clients' concerns. Nothing herein constitutes a waiver or election
of any remedies or rights by my client.
Sincerely,

K~en

RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

Attorneys for Buyer New York Ave, LLC

1049491
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WWW.BALLARDSPAHR.COM

PHOENIX, AZ
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WASHINGTON, OC
WILMINGTON, OE

JASON O. BOREN
DIRECT DIAL: 80Hll7·6827

September 2, 2009

PERSONAL F"AX: 801·596·8827
BORENJOBALLARDSPAHR.COM

-VIA FACSIMILE AND HAND DELIVERY
Keith A. Kelly, Esq.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER

36 S State Street # 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

New York Ave, L.L.C. v. David and Jan Harrison
Civil No. 090402295

Dear Keith:
We are in receipt of your letter dated August 31, 2009, in the above-referenced matter.
Like your previous correspondence, your letter attempts to insert conditions and other terms
which are not part of the Real Estate Purchase Contract between New York Ave, LLC and David
and Jan Harrison.
Contrary to your assertions, the contract was not amended due to the alleged
unavailability of the sewer. If your client was not satisfied with what it discovered during the
due diligence period, the Real Estate Purchase Contract provided for specific procedures to
address such concerns. Your client failed to provide any written objections pursuant to the Real
Estate Purchase Contract and cannot now claim that it was dissatisfied with what it discovered in
the due diligence period.
Despite your client's claims that it cannot develop the property as originally anticipated,
it has done nothing, to our knowledge, to obtain sewer, or any other development rights or other
entitlements that may affect development of the property. Your client cannot sit idly by and wait
for someone else to accomplish what is solely within its ability and control. To do so constitutes
a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Moreover, your client's unexpressed intentions and "understanding" are simply irrelevant
to the express language of the Real Estate Purchase Contract. See Jaramillo v. Farmers Ins.
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Group, 669 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Utah 1983) ("It is well established in the law that unexpressed
intentions do not affect the validity of a contract").In short, your attempt to modify the terms of the Real Estate Purchase Contract and to
make the negotiation of the monthly check conditioned upon your client's unilateral and
unexpressed intentions and "understanding" is not only inappropriate, but constitutes a further
breach of the parties' Real Estate Purchase Contract. See Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653 (Utah
App. 1997) (valid tender requires buyer to make bona fide unconditional offer of payment).
Accordingly, we enclose and return the check that you hand delivered to our offices. Please be
advised that we will continue to accept the monthly checks so long as you withdraw your
inappropriate conditions.
By reason of your inappropriate and conditional tender of these monies, my clients intend
to amend their counterclaim to assert a claim for your client's latest breach. Please notify me by
the end of the week whether you will stipulate to allow the Harrisons to amend their
counterclaim. In the event you refuse to do so, we will file a motion to amend with the Court.
We look forward to your response.

Additionally, as you know, it has always been our position that the transaction should be
closed within a reasonable time. See Bradfordv. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (It is well
established in Utah that when a contract fails to specify a time by which a certain act must be
perfonned, the law implies that the act must be done within a reasonable time). We have always
been willing to discuss and negotiate a reasonable closing date. You have rejected our offers and
attempts. We continue to be willing to discuss this matter. However, we believe the ball is in
your court. Please let me know if you have any interest in discussing this matter further.

JDB/ldi
Enclosure
cc:
Mark R. Gaylord, Esq.
Steven J. Newman, Esq.
Michael D. Mayfield, Esq.
Mr. David Harrison
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